Google AdSense: Kokott proposes reviewing annulment of the fine, but there is no CJEU judgment yet
The Advocate General proposes returning the AdSense case to the General Court. Her Opinion is not binding and the fine should be reduced in any event.

Advocate General Juliane Kokott proposes setting aside the judgment annulling the European Commission's Google AdSense decision and referring the case back to the General Court. The proposal appears in her Opinion of 12 November 2026 in case C-826/24 P, according to the Court of Justice's official press release. It is not a CJEU judgment and does not itself reinstate a fine: Opinions do not bind the judges, who will decide later.
The case concerns contractual practices in search-advertising intermediation and a fine of almost €1.5 billion imposed in 2019. Kokott considers that the General Court demanded too much detail when examining one criterion used to assess exclusionary effects. At the same time, she warns that the fine would have to be reduced in any event, because certain findings concerning 2016 were not appealed and have become final.
The service and clauses examined
The press release explains that Google has operated the AdSense advertising intermediation platform since 2003. Within it, AdSense for Search, AFS, allowed operators of websites with integrated search engines to display Google search advertisements and receive a share of the resulting revenue. Operators could negotiate Google Services Agreements for one or several websites.
Contract templates used from March 2009 contained clauses restricting or prohibiting advertisements from competing services. The release distinguishes an exclusivity clause, a placement clause and a prior-authorisation clause. These are not three names for the same conduct: each addressed a dimension of the contractual relationship with the website operator.
The first prohibited use of competing services on the relevant websites. The second required a minimum number of Google advertisements and restricted where rival advertisements could appear. The third required Google's approval before certain changes to displayed search advertisements. This description concerns the historical period analysed, not a statement about the service's current commercial terms.
From the Commission to the General Court
Following several complaints, the Commission initiated proceedings in July 2016 concerning those clauses and informed Google that they might constitute abuse of a dominant position. In September that year, the company stopped applying or amended them. The March 2019 decision found three separate infringements between 2006 and 2016 which together constituted a single and continuous infringement.
The Commission imposed a fine of almost €1.5 billion, in part jointly and severally with Alphabet. Google and Alphabet challenged it before the General Court, which annulled the decision by judgment of 18 September 2024. According to the official summary, the reason was insufficient examination of relevant circumstances, particularly the contractual relationship's duration, and the consequent failure to demonstrate infringements.
The Commission then appealed to the Court of Justice. The release defines its request: set aside the judgment and dismiss the companies' action in so far as they dispute the clauses' capacity to restrict competition between 31 March 2009 and 31 December 2015. That period should not automatically be extended to all of 2016.
The debate over exclusion criteria
Kokott starts from recognised criteria for examining exclusionary effects arising from contractual commitments imposed by a dominant undertaking on its customers. The release calls them the Intel criteria and includes the commitment's duration among them. The issue she identifies is not that duration is unimportant, but how its examination fits into the overall assessment.
In her view, the General Court moved from requiring analysis of every relevant circumstance to demanding particularly intensive detail for each individual criterion. This approach would allow annulment for an isolated shortcoming without relating it sufficiently to the other elements. The Advocate General considers the requirement applied to duration excessive.
The proposal maintains that the analysis must be overall. According to the release, the General Court had recognised, for other criteria, that the clauses could produce exclusionary effects and that the Commission had met its demonstration obligation. For Kokott, that finding could not be undermined through a legally erroneous assessment of the agreements' duration or possible unilateral termination.
Individual contracts and collective assessment
The Advocate General considers it mistaken to require the Commission to examine every underlying contract and its application in detail to determine each one's contribution to exclusionary effects. The release summarises an alternative: consider cumulatively contracts significant to competition on the market and their durations, assessing whether their content and application could collectively produce those effects.
According to that Opinion, the Commission met the relevant requirements through an overall assessment and, in some respects, average values concerning the clauses' contribution. The criticism does not mean that the Commission may dispense with evidence or relevant circumstances. It concerns the detail required and the relationship between one criterion and the evaluation's general context.
Kokott also considers that the error about exclusionary effects affected the finding concerning a single and continuous infringement. This is a consequence within the reasoning she proposes to the Court of Justice, not a judicial ruling already made. Maintaining that attribution is particularly important when the headline concerns a large fine.
Why she proposes referring the case back
The General Court did not examine all of Google's pleas and arguments. The Advocate General therefore proposes referral back, rather than presenting her Opinion as finally deciding every outstanding issue. Those issues include objections to the amount of the fine. Publication of the Opinion does not automatically end the proceedings.
The reduction mentioned in the release has a specific basis: the Commission did not challenge the General Court's findings about insufficient demonstration of exclusionary effects in 2016. Those findings are final and must be considered when deciding on the penalty again. The source does not permit calculation of a final amount here or anticipation of the judges' approach.
For context, readers can consult our law-firm operations section, coverage of shareholder data publicity before the CJEU and the editorial analysis of related markets and competition. These are separate readings, not sources of a final AdSense ruling. What is confirmed on 12 November is a reasoned proposal from the Advocate General, pending judgment.
Additional context
The release also recalls the procedural framework of an appeal: it concerns points of law against decisions of the General Court. If admissible and well founded, the Court of Justice sets the contested decision aside. Where the state of proceedings permits, it may give final judgment itself; otherwise, it refers the case back to the General Court, which is bound by the appeal decision. This general explanation in the document helps distinguish a proposed referral from a fresh trial of every fact. It does not confirm that any of those judicial decisions has already occurred in these proceedings.
Sources
Official CURIA press release 164/26 of 12 November, consulted on 15 November 2026. Its anchor older than 48 hours is expressly identified. The article explains the full release; it does not present an independent review of the complete case file or attribute binding force to the Opinion. This source confirms no new amount for the fine.
Fuentes
- Source. Accessed 15 November 2026.
The specific data in this article come from the official sources cited.


